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COMMENTS
EMPLOYERS' MUTUAL AID: NO ANTITRUST LAWS NEED
APPLY AND ALMOST ALL'S FAIR IN INDUSTRIAL WAR
I. INTRODUCTION
Several major industries will be negotiating new collective bargaining
agreements in 1976 and a large number of labor disputes are expected. In four
industries-rubber, textiles, trucking and electrical manufacturing-union
demands will be greater than usual because their present contracts were
negotiated under the restraint of economic controls.' At the same time,
management resistance will probably be stronger since increases in productiv-
ity have been barely perceptible. Any excess of labor cost increases over
productivity gains will be reflected in either higher prices or lower profits. 2
Under these circumstances, both sides will be preparing to use whatever
means are available to achieve their conflicting goals.
A strike, or the possibility of one, is the primary source of bargaining power
for organized labor.3 A union can substantially increase the economic pressure
created by this weapon by applying it selectively against one employer or a
group of employers, while allowing competing businesses to continue opera-
tions without interruption. 4 Competitors may take the struck employers'
business during the strike, and of greater significance, they may divert some
customers permanently. In such a predicament, employers will more readily
accede to union demands and these presumably favorable terms can then be
used as a pattern, or perhaps a base, to obtain similar or greater benefits from
the remaining employers. This selective or "whipsaw" strike also renders
public opposition less likely since service is still provided by the non-struck
businesses. The striking workers need not suffer serious hardship because
union members who continue to work can contribute to strike benefit funds.5
The whipsaw is available in any market where the employees of competing
firms are unionized. 6 In most cases, these competitors will be part of a formal
1. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1976, at 31, col. 1.
2. See id., Jan. 4, 1976, at 60, col. 1; id., Jan. 13, 1976, at 45, col. 1.
3. The Developing Labor Law: The Board, the Courts, and the National Labor Relations Act
517 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
4. See, e.g., NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 284 (1965); NLRB v. Teamsters Local 449, 353
U.S. 87 (1957); Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 972 (1975); Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366, 368-69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 830 (1963); Clune v. Publishers' Ass'n, 214 F. Supp. 520, 523 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd mem.,
314 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1963) (per curiam).
5. Also, if the union wishes, marginal employers who might be destroyed by a strike can be
spared. See Newborn, The Validity of the Selective Strike Under the Railway Labor Act, 60 Geo.
L.J. 583 (1972); Note, Interest-Balancing and the Use of Economic Weapons in Labor
Disputes-A New Look at Management's Arsenal, 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 102, 113-14 (1965).
6. The same pressure would be exerted on an employer where the employees of its com-
petitors were not unionized, but the result would probably be unfavorable to the union. In this
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multiemployer bargaining unit, 7 either sanctioned by the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) or agreed to by the union. 8 However, as in the
airline industry, 9 the whipsaw can be equally effective even absent mul-
tiemployer bargaining. The tactic is particularly powerful in service indus-
tries, which are more vulnerable than manufacturing industries to any type of
strike, since stockpiling is unavailable, business lost during a strike is more
difficult to recover and repetitive customers are essential.' 0
NLRB v. Teamsters Local 449,11 the so-called Buffalo Linen case, estab-
lished that there is no violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)12
when employers, who have bargained as a unit, defend against the whipsaw
by locking out non-striking union members. 13 This response eliminates the
threat of losing business temporarily or permanently to competitors. It also
exerts increased pressure on the union since a strike benefit fund will be more
rapidly depleted with more members drawing on the fund and no working
members contributing to it.
14
situation the employer cannot assume that the same costs will be imposed upon its competitors, so
there would be no point in capitulating quickly only to have its prices undercut by non-union
employers. This circumstance is a major incentive for unions to organize along product market
lines. See notes 30-33 infra and accompanying text.
7. Seventy-one percent of all non-manufacturing and thirty-one percent of all manufacturing
collective bargaining agreements arise from union negotiations with a multiemployer unit. Cohen,
Coordinated Bargaining and Structures of Collective Bargaining, 26 Lab. L.J. 375, 376 (1975).
Compare Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 713 n.20 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
8. E.g., NLRB v. Hart, 453 F.2d 215, 217-18 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 844
(1972); Andes Fruit Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 781, 44 L.R.R.M. 1487 (1959); Rayonier, Inc., 52
N.L.R.B. 1269, 13 L.R.R.M. 91 (1943).
9. The agreement which the International Association of Machinists reached with United
Airlines after a recent whipsaw strike "is expected to set a pattern in IAM negotiations at several
other large carriers." Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1975, at 6, col. 3; see Redenius, Structural Instability
in Airline Industrial Relations, 22 Lab. L.J. 558, 563-65 (1971). During 1976, the prime example
of a selective strike in the absence of multiemployer bargaining will probably be in the automobile
industry. Ford Motor Company has already been identified as the most likely target. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 25, 1976, § 3, at 2, col. 8.
10. See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 284 (1965); Redenius, Structural Instability in Airline
Industrial Relations, 22 Lab. L.J. 558, 561 (1971).
11. 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
13. 353 U.S. at 97. See also American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308-18 (1965)
(offensive or bargaining lockout is not an unfair labor practice for an employer acting alone);
Duvin, The Bargaining Lockout- An Impatient Warrior, 40 Notre Dame Law. 137 (1965).
14. Of course, in some states, after a fairly prolonged waiting period, public assistance may
be provided to strikers and their families by unemployment or welfare payments. Pati & Hill,
Economic Strikers, Public Aid and Industrial Relations, 23 Lab. L.J. 32, 35-36 (1972); Comment,
Strikers' Eligibility for Public Assistance: The Standard Based on Need, 52 J. Urban L. 115
(1974); Note, Federal Preemption-State Payment of Unemployment Compensation to Strikers as
Prohibited by Federal Labor Policy, 20 Wayne L. Rev. 1191 (1974). Support funds may also be
transferred from a parent union or other allied unions. F. Peterson, American Labor Unions-
What They Are and How They Work 162 (2d rev. ed. 1963); Cohen, Coordinated Bargaining and
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However, the multiemployer defensive lockout is not always desirable. In
some regulated industries,15 the device is less attractive because such con-
certed employer action would probably bring government intervention with
results unfavorable to the employers.' 6 Where employers market perishable
products or services, revenue lost during a lockout cannot be recovered by
increased business afterwards. Employers may also fear undesirable effects
upon public opinion or their own labor relations.1 7 Moreover, absent mul-
tiemployer bargaining, a lockout in response to a whipsaw has been held an
unfair labor practice.' 8 As a result, various forms of mutual assistance pacts
or strike insurance plans, analogous to union strike benefit funds, have been
created. 19 Employers who continue to operate support the struck firm in the
hope that it can withstand the whipsaw and obtain a more acceptable pattern
for the other employers. The effectiveness of this aid is limited.2 0 The striking
workers will be similarly supported by the union and the inter-employer aid
does nothing to alleviate the pressure of losing customers permanently.
In the future, other forms of mutual aid may be attempted. One option
would be to combine a lockout with support for the marginal employer who
faces the greatest pressure during a strike and who, therefore, constitutes the
greatest threat to employer solidarity. 2' Absent such support, the weak
Structures of Collective Bargaining, 26 Lab. L.J. 375, 379 (1975). During the 1967 strike in the
rubber industry the United Rubber Workers (URW) received a fifty thousand dollar contribution
from the AFL-CIO, and the United Auto Workers (UAW) provided "two interest-free loans in the
seven-figure bracket." Hirsch, Strike Insurance and Collective Bargaining, 22 Ind. & Lab. Rel.
Rev. 399, 403 (1969) (hereinafter cited as Hirsch].
15. E.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB, 502 F.2d 4S3 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 972 (1975); Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830
(1963).
16. This may also be one of the reasons for a union's decision to whipsaw since a marketwide
strike would incite greater public opposition. Newborn, The Validity of the Selective Strike
Under the Railway Labor Act, 60 Geo. L.J. 583 (1972).
17. McPherson, Cooperation Among Auto Managements in Collective Bargaining, 11 Lab.
L.J. 607, 613 (1960).
18. NLRB v. Great AUt. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 F.2d 690, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1965). But cf.
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), discussed at notes 214-15 infra and
accompanying text.
19. Among the industries having such agreements are newspaper publishing, rubber, air and
rail transportation, and segments of agriculture in California and Hawaii. Similar agreements are
suspected in the automobile, steel and trucking industries. Hirsch, supra note 14, at 399; Foster,
Employers Strike Insurance, 12 Lab. Hist. 483 (1971).
20. In a recent strike, even though United Airlines received support payments from its
competitors, the International Association of Machinists (IAM) still achieved a twenty-eight
percent wage increase over a three year term. By 1978 mechanics will be earning $10 an hour
with a reduced retirement age and improved pension benefits. Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1975, at 6,
col. 3. In the rubber industry, however, a similar pact appears to be more effective. Id., Jan. 26,
1976, at 4, col. 4; see notes 243-45 infra and accompanying text.
21. "[f1t is logical that respondents should have been concerned that one or more of their
number might bolt the group and come to terms wth the Local, thus destroying the common front
essential to multiemployer bargaining." NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 284 (1965).
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business may settle and thus recreate the whipsaw situation. This tactic
would be equally applicable to a unit-wide strike.
Concerted employer action is, of course, a business combination which
raises questions under both the antitrust laws22 and the labor laws. The
application of these two bodies of law to strike insurance and related
employer activity is the subject of this Comment.
II. APPLICABILITY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO THE LABOR MARKET
The Sherman Act 23 was designed to prevent "restraints to free competition
in business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production,
raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or
consumers of goods and services .... "24 When courts applied it to
combinations of employees who sought to eliminate competition in the labor
market, 25 the Act threatened the continued existence of many unions. 26 There
was no serious danger that a union in itself would be declared unlawful, 27 but
the effects of organizing activity on commercial competition between employ-
ers were used as grounds for successful antitrust suits. 28 In most cases the
union had engaged in secondary activity such as boycotts, and the decisions
22. After Buffalo Linen, the legality of the multiemployer bargaining unit is beyond dispute.
An earlier commentator had questioned whether the very existence of a multlemployer group
might be an antitrust violation. Note, The NLRB and Multi-Employer Units in a Competitive
Economy, 43 I1. L. Rev. 877, 881-82 (1949).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
24. Apex'Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
25. Unions seek to eliminate labor market competition both between employees and between
employers. Moreover, they have every incentive to restrain product market competition since this
would create more spoils to divide and less need for employers to resist labor cost Increases.
Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union
Activities, 73 Yale L.J. 14, 18-19 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Winter].
26. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 301 (1908) (Danbury Hatters) (broad language of the
Sherman Act to be literally construed in light of failure of congressional attempts to exempt
unions). Loewe was preceded by similar lower court rulings. The first was United States v.
Workingmen's Amal. Council, 54 F. 994 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 57 F. 85 (5th Cir. 1893), involving one
of the few general strikes in American history. Only one lower court held the Act inapplicable to
labor organizations. United States v. Patterson, 55 F. 605, 641 (D. Mass. 1893).
27. Carr, Section 6 of the Clayton Act: A Review, 26 Lab. L.J. 624, 635 (1975). In
congressional testimony, Samuel Gompers "stated his fear that while he did not believe that
courts would declare the existence of labor unions per se to be violations of the Sherman Act, he
believed that [union agreements with multiemployer groups] would be held unlawful ...... Local
189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 701-02 n.3 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(italics omitted). But see Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 202 F. 512, 556 (N.D.W. Va.
1912), rev'd, 214 F. 685 (4th Cir. 1914), rev'd, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (district court held union was
a common law conspiracy which violated the Sherman Act). One commentator asserts that Loewe
v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), "gave no assurances that unions might not be illegal organiza-
tions under the Act." Winter, supra note 25, at 32.
28. E.g., Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927)
(refusal to work on non-union products); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443
(1921) (same, plus secondary boycott); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (nationwide
secondary consumer boycott).
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could be described as judicial legislation prohibiting labor union tactics which
were unacceptable to conservative courts. 29 However, even if the union had
conducted only a primary strike, antitrust liability could still arise if the
requisite intent to reduce product market competition were present. Thus, in
the two Coronado cases, 30 the Supreme Court first held that a United Mine
Workers (UMW) organizing strike, which clearly reduced the supply of coal in
interstate commerce, was nevertheless a "local" matter concerning conditions
of employment which did not come within the Sherman Act.3 1 Yet, when a
second trial produced sufficient evidence to show that the union's primary
purpose was the elimination of competition from non-union coal, the Court
held that the exact same conduct could be a violation of the Act. 32 The
disastrous implications for the future of unions were obvious since the
elimination of commercial competition from less expensive non-union prod-
ucts is always a major aim of organizing activity. 33
The subsequent declaration of an antitrust exemption for organized labor
will be discussed below. 34 The important point here is that the applicability of
the antitrust laws, the Sherman Act and its later appendages, 3s is limited to
commercial or product markets. 36 They do not apply to conduct which
restrains competition only in the labor market. As observed in Apex Hosiery
29. Judges and commentators alike have doubted the capacity of the courts to make such
broad policy determinations. Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 697 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 48S (1921)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 252, 283 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Cox]; Sovern, Some Ruminations on Labor, the
Antitrust Laws and Allen Bradley, 13 Lab. L.J. 957, 963 (1962); Winter, supra note 25, at 16-17.
30. Coronado Coal Co. v. UMV, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259
U.S. 344 (1922); see Winter, supra note 25, at 36-38.
31. 259 U.S. at 412-13. See also Industrial Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 77 (1925)
(similar holding in regard to employers' concerted anti-union activity).
32. 268 U.S. at 310. "The doctrine of the Coronado Case is that it is the intent to stop
production for the purpose of controlling interstate commerce and not the methods used which
makes the act unlawful." Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 35 F.2d 203, 208
(E.D. Pa. 1929). This may have beer/ a distinction without a difference. One commentator
describes the Coronado standard as an "accordion-like instrument with which to include or
exclude labor union activities from antitrust's strictures, dependent upon the philosophic outlook
of the individual judge." Handler, Labor and Antitrust: A Bit of History, 40 Antitrust L.J. 233,
235 (1971).
33. Only in oligopolies, where employers have already reduced commercial competition,
would organizing be done primarily for the benefit of non-unionized workers. If product
competition were not reduced unionized employers would either fail or pressure their employees
to relinquish whatever gains the union may have achieved. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U.S. 443, 448 (1921).
34. See text accompanying note 88 infra.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-77 (1970).
36. "No one seriously suggests that antitrust policy should be concerned with the labor
market per se." Cox, supra note 29, at 254. Nevertheless, the suggestion has been made that
under modem industrial conditions labor markets should be included within the antitrust laws.
Siegel, Connolly & Walker, The Antitrust Exemption for Labor-Magna Carta or Carte
Blanche?, 13 Duquesne L. Rev. 411, 472 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Siegel].
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Co. v. Leader,37 the "Court has never applied the Sherman Act in any case,
whether or not involving labor organizations or activities, unless the Court
was of opinion that there was some form of restraint upon commercial
competition in the marketing of goods or services . . . . ,
However, some courts ignore this fundamental limitation when they en-
counter concerted employer activity in the labor market. For example, in
Cordova v. Bache & Co., 39 brokerage houses had allegedly conspired to fix a
uniform maximum share of commissions for the securities dealers they em-
.ployed. Plaintiffs asserted "that the effect of the conspiracy has been to reduce
competition in the hiring of representatives and in the compensation paid to
them .... "40 Although section 6 of the Clayton Act expressly declares that
human labor is "not a commodity or article of commerce"4 1 as those words are
used in the antitrust laws, it did not follow, in the district court's view, that
the compensation paid for human labor was also .beyond the scope of those
statutes. 4 2 The court held that in the absence of collective bargaining the
alleged conspiracy stated a claim under the Sherman Act.
43
Other than a comparison of the wage-fixing scheme with a price-fixing
agreement, there was no discussion of any restraint on commercial competi-
37. 310 U.s. 469 (1940).
38. Id. at 495. Apex was the first case to recognize a potentially extensive antitrust exemption
for labor in section 6 of the Clayton Act, which left unions subject to the Sherman Act "to some
extent not defined." Id. at 488. Moreover, in dictum which, without bothering to mention It,
overruled the second Coronado case, the Court found a major exemption in the nature of the
Sherman Act itself: "[Aln elimination of price competition based on differences in labor standards
[is not] considered to be the kind of curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman
Act." Id. at 503-04. Compare Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622
(1975), which described a nonstatutory antitrust exemption for union-employer agreements as a
"tolerance for the lessening of business competition based on differences in wages and working
conditions." These exemptions, however, did not apply to the facts of Apex. The sitdown strikers
involved escaped treble damage antitrust liability only because their employer's output was too
insignificant or the strike too brief to affect the market price of hosiery. 310 U.S. at 500-01. The
case lost some significance when the Court declared an even stronger exemption for unions in the
very next term. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232-34 (1941). In addition, "[clom-
mentators have questioned Stone's [the author of the Apex opinion] scholarship, his logic, and his
synthesis of the applicable precedents." Handier, Labor and Antitrust: A Bit of History, 40
Antitrust L.J. 233, 235 (1971). Nonetheless, the holding in Apex, applicable to any defendant and
still good law, was that restraints on interstate commerce are within the Sherman Act's
prohibitions only if "they are intended to have, or in fact have, the effects on the [product] market
." 310 U.S. at 512; see Cox, supra note 29, at 262-64; Winter, supra note 25, at 39-44.
39. 321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
40. Id. at 603.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970).
42. 321 F. Supp. at 606. The court noted that Samuel Gompers "would probably turn in his
grave if he were credited with urging an exemption that would permit employers jointly and
unilaterally to reduce wages of their employees." Id.
43. Id. at 608. Lest it be misunderstood, the court distinguished the collusion alleged In
Cordova from the "going rate" paid to law school graduates hired by large law firms which
"result[s] from competition between employers." Id. at 606 n.2 (italics omitted).
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tion. In most industries this omission would not, in itself, lead to the wrong
result because labor market restraints will often lessen product market
competition. 4 4 More specifically, an agreement among employers to fix wages
not only eliminates wage competition but, if the employers compete in the
same product market, also reduces price competition to the extent that prices
are dependent on labor costs. In Cordova, however, the court admitted that
commissions charged to customers-i.e., product market prices-were uni-
formly fixed by the defendant New York Stock Exchange under the regula-
tion of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).4 s A wage-fixing conspir-
acy cannot reduce price competition where no price competition exists.
4 6
Thus, taking everything alleged as true, it is submitted that there was no
claim stated under the Sherman Act.47
Cordova is an exceptional case, but it shows the danger of a mechanical
application of the antitrust laws to every combination of employers. The
Seventh Circuit more rigorously analyzed a similar problem in NichoLs V.
Spencer International Press, Inc. 4 8 Competing encyclopedia firms entered a
"no-switch" agreement whereby competitors would refuse to hire sales per-
44. See notes 48-51 infra and accompanying text.
45. 321 F. Supp. at 605 n.1. This price-fixing was impliedly exempt from antitrust challenge
under the then prevailing case law, Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357-61
(1963), because such a suit would interfere with SEC regulation and subject defendants to the
possibility of divergent views on the legality of their price setting practices. The Court recently
held to this effect in Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975). The opinion
outlines the history of stock exchange price fixing and increasingly strict SEC regulation,
culminating in 1975 with the elimination of price fixing. Id. at 668-82; see Note, SEC Regulation
As a Pervasive Regulatory Scheme-Implied Repeal of the Antitrust Laws with Respect to
National Security Exchanges and the NASD, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 355 (1975).
46. Nor would the conspiracy hinder entry into the industry as would a restraint upon the
mobility of workers. See notes 48-51 infra and accompanying text. Nevertheless, in a later
decision in the same case, Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 520
F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 784 (1976), both courts failed to make any
distinction between the product and labor markets. A price increase, needed to keep some
members of the New York Stock Exchange solvent, was approved by the SEC and exempt from
the antitrust laws. However, the Exchange required member firms "to exclude the service charge
from the basis upon which they calculated compensation" of their employees. 377 F. Supp. at 88.
Although agreeing with Cordova that a labor market restraint would be enough to violate the
antitrust laws, both courts found that the Exchange rule did not restrain the competition among
firms for securities representatives.
47. The employers' collusive restriction of workers' income may have been distasteful and,
unlike the early labor antitrust cases, the defendant businessmen were precisely the type of
persons at whom the antitrust laws were aimed. Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676, 700-01 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797,
801-02 & n.3 (1945); R. Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act (1930); F. Frankfurter & N.
Greene, The Labor Injunction 139 n. 17 (1930). Yet, the applicability of a statute should not be
expanded merely because of the identity of the defendant, nor should the antitrust laws be used to
implement a court's preferences in labor-management relations. The employees' remedies were
organization, collective bargaining and, if necessary, a strike.
48. 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967).
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sonnel formerly employed by a party to the agreement for a six-month period
after termination of such employment. Plaintiffs claimed the resulting reduc-
tion in labor market competition violated the Sherman Act. The court
explained that "the antitrust laws were not enacted for the purpose of
preserving freedom in the labor market . . . ..,49 However, defendants were
not entitled to summary judgment because their conduct "may also, depend-
ing upon the circumstances, impair full and free competition in the supply of
a service or commodity to the public. °50 Experienced salesmen might avoid
joining a risky new firm since, if their new employer were to fail, they would
suffer a substantial period of enforced unemployment. The "no-switch"
agreement, therefore, could impair entry into the industry and whether it did
operate to exclude potential competitors presented a question of fact for tilejury. 5 1
When viewed properly, as in Nichols, antitrust suits brought by employees,
including the recent series of professional sports cases, S2 are grounded in a
public harm caused by employers' anti-competitive behavior in the marketing
of goods and services. The basic issues are usually whether the commercial
restraints are reasonable and whether the employees have standing to sue.
5 3
Given that the applicability of the antitrust laws is limited to commercial
markets, it appears that employers' strike insurance, used to aid the whipsaw
victim or support the marginal firm during a market-wide strike, is not subject
to antitrust challenge. Mutual aid in these two situations is an example of
49. Id. at 335.
50. Id. at 336; accord, Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359, 363 (1926) (agreement to
hire only those seamen who were registered with an employers' association); Union Circulation
Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 1957) ("no-switch" agreement); Taterka v. Wisconsin
Tel. Co., 394 F. Supp. 862, 865 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (same).
51. 371 F.2d at 337.
52. Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (settled, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1976, at 27, col. 2); Boston Prof. Hockey Ass'n v.
Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass.), remanded, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972); Denver Rockets
v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971); cf. Flood v, Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258 (1972); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Courts are especially prone to disregard the labor-product market
distinction in professional sports cases. See, e.g., 389 F. Supp. at 892; 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
Perhaps judges have difficulty viewing these high salaried plaintiffs as part of labor. Certainly, In
the past, courts did not consider professional sports to be a business and, even today, baseball is
still treated as a game. Flood v. Kuhn, supra; Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356
(1953); Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). Of course, the failure to
make the labor-product market distinction in these cases is harmless since the commercial
purpose and effect of the labor market restraints are particularly obvious. A separate problem
raised by these suits is the unknown effect upon collective bargaining of permitting antitrust
actions by players who are represented by a union. Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and
Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 Yale L.J. 1, 7 (1971).
53. E.g., Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957); Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
471 F.2d 727, 730 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); Freeman v. Eastman-Whipstock,
Inc., 390 F. Supp. 685, 689 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Mans v. Sunray Dx Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 1095,
1098 (N.D. Okla. 1971).
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concerted employer activity which has neither the purpose nor the effect of
reducing commercial competition. The purpose in both instances is to obtain a
settlement with the union which reflects the real economic balance in the
industry, rather than to accept a distorted agreement resulting from inten-
sified pressure on the isolated struck employer or the weak business. In these
circumstances where the union has struck the first blow, there is no im-
mediate commercial market effect. The strikers have already reduced product
competition or eliminated it entirely. In the long run, presumably by keeping
labor costs at a lower level than they would have been absent mutual aid,
commercial competition will be maintained or enhanced. Marginal firms will
have a better chance of survival and, where feasible, outsiders may be
attracted to enter the industry.
Of course, a mutual aid pact could include an illegal anti-competitive
clause. For example, the original agreement in the airline industry required
the beneficiary of aid to channel stranded passengers to alternate flights only
on those carriers which were contributing to the support fund.5 4 While
upholding the agreement as a whole, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
deleted this section as an unjustified restraint upon commercial competition.-s
In addition, it has been suggested that strike insurance could create a claim
under the Sherman Act for any competitor who was not a party to the
agreement.5 6 Those employers who benefited from the plan would presum-
ably obtain a more favorable union contract and use their lower labor costs,
gained only through their concerted action, to establish a competitive advan-
tage in the product market. However, the very purpose of these support
agreements is to spread losses and, in practice, employers have tried to
include as many risk bearers as possible.57 If participating employers were
nevertheless to refuse admission to a competitor, it would appear to be a
group boycott and a possible Sherman Act violation.
58
The only case directly on point, Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 9 supports
this analysis. Members of a union which had whipsawed the defendant
attacked the strike insurance plan of the Association of American Railroads.
The plan had provided $1,300,000 to the L.I.R.R. during a twenty-six day
54. Six-Carrier Mut. Aid Pact, 29 C.A.B. 168, 174-75 & n.31 (1959).
55. Id.
56. Note, Strike Insurance: An Analysis of the Legality of Interemployer Economic Aid
Under the Present Federal Legislation, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 126, 134 n.53 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Strike Insurance Note].
57. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Intl v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 972 (1975); Strike Insurance Note, supra note 56, at 130 & n.21.
58. Comment, Six Carrier Mutual Aid Pact: A New Concept of Lanagement Strike Strategy
in the Airline Industry, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 205, 225-26 (1960). Even in this situation the
participating employers might be able to justify their action if, for example, the excluded
employer had a history of poor labor relations with a consequent increase in strikes. See Woolley,
Is a Boycott a Per Se Violation of the Antitrust Laws?, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 773, 774-75 (1974).
The possibility of an employer's exemption from the antitrust laws for the use of mutual aid and
related activities is discussed at notes 137-92 infra and accompanying text.
59. 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963).
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strike. 60 Plaintiffs alleged that the payment of money to aid one's competitor
was a per se violation of the Sherman Act. The Second Circuit flatly rejected
the claim "for the fundamental reason that the [antitrust laws] were designed
principally to outlaw restraints upon commercial competition in the marketing
and pricing of goods and services and were not intended as instruments for
the regulation of labor-management relations."'6
1
Ill. AN EMPLOYERS' ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
Certain other types of concerted employer action, such as a lockout and
mutual aid in support of a lockout, have a clear and drastic impact upon
commercial markets. But for the employers' share of labor's antitrust exemp-
tion described below, the antitrust laws would apply.
The Danbury Hatters case, Loewe v. Lawlor,62 which held that unions
were subject to the Sherman Act, accelerated labor's drive to gain an
exemption from that statute. 63 In 1914, Samuel Gompers believed that the
"industrial Magna Charta"64 had arrived in the form of sections 6 and 20 of
the Clayton Act.65 Section 6 declared that "[t]he labor of a human being is not
a commodity or article of commerce." Moreover, the antitrust laws were not
to "be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . organiza-
tions .... "66 The first paragraph of section 20 merely codified the traditional
rules of equity and applied them to any case "between employers and
employees" arising from a "dispute concerning terms or conditions of em-
ployment."'67 The crucial second paragraph stated that the federal courts
could not grant an injunction to prohibit the performance of certain specified
activities 68 by any party to a labor dispute even if the petitioner would suffer
irreparable harm and had no adequate legal remedy. Most importantly, all
the activities enumerated in the second paragraph of section 20 were not to be
held violations "of any law of the United States." 69
The exemption was first interpreted by the Supreme Court seven years later
in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering. 70 Plaintiff, the only non-unionized
60. Id. at 370. Union members received over a million dollars in strike benefits during the
same period, most of which was paid by the railroads as required by statute. Id.
61. Id. at 372-73; accord, Six-Carrier Mut. Aid Pact, 29 C.A.B. 168, 174-75 (1959).
62. 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
63. "In all, there appear to have been twelve bills introduced in Congress prior to the passage
of the Clayton Act which would have exempted labor, to one degree or another, from application
of the Sherman Act." Siegel, supra note 36, at 420 n.36 (listing the various bills).
64. "Those words, 'the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce,'
are sledge-hammer blows to the wrongs and injustices so long inflicted upon the workers. This
declaration is the industrial Magna Charta upon which the working people will rear their
construction of industrial freedom." 21 Am. Federationist 971 (1914).
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1970) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1970).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970).
67. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
68. See text accompanying note 177 infra.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
70. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
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manufacturer of printing presses in the country, was able to charge lower
prices than its competitors because of its correspondingly lower labor costs. As
a result, the unionized manufacturers indicated that they would have to
terminate their collective bargaining agreements unless Duplex were forced to
sign a similar agreement. 71 The union, having been unsuccessful in organizing
Duplex, instituted a secondary boycott against both Duplex customers and
those who shipped or installed Duplex products. 72 Relying on the second
paragraph of section 20, the lower courts denied an injunction against the
union members who were carrying on the boycott, but the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the exemption applied only to the parties immediately
involved in a labor dispute. 7 3 The facts would appear to indicate that every
union member had a personal economic stake in the outcome of the struggle
with Duplex.74 The Court, however, imported the phrase "between employers
and employees" from the first paragraph of section 20 into the second
paragraph and used it as the definition of a labor dispute. Justice Pitney,
writing for the Court, reasoned that the statute, as a limitation upon the
powers of equity, should be strictly construed. Therefore, the exemption it
provided extended only to those union members who were also "past, present,
or prospective" employees of Duplex.7s The Justice may have expressed some
underlying fears when he concluded that "Congress had in mind particular
industrial controversies, not a general class war."1
7 6
A decade later Congress responded to Duplex with the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.77 The new statute reiterated much of section 2078 and expanded the
definition of labor dispute to include any economic or organizational con-
troversy "regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee." 79
In United States v. Hutcheson,8 0 the Court read the Norris-LaGuardia Act
as a reaffirmation and expansion of the Clayton Act, creating a broad
antitrust immunity for both primary and secondary union activity.8 '
Undoubtedly, Congress intended this Act to prohibit the use of an injunction
against secondary activity. The legislative history of the statute, however,
fails to disclose any larger purpose.8 2 Moreover, there is no language in the
71. Id. at 480 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 463-64.
73. 247 F. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), aff'd, 252 F. 722 (2d Cir. 1918), rev'd, 254 U.S. 443, 470-71
(1921).
74. 254 U.S. at 480-81 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 472.
76. Id.
77. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
78. Id. § 104.
79. Id. § 113(c).
80. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
81. See text accompanying note 88 infra.
82. H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1932). Senator Norris stated that "[t]he bill does not protect anyone ... from punishment for the
commission of any unlawful act .... ." 75 Cong. Rec. 4507 (1932). And. in the House,
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statute comparable to the closing provision of section 20 which expressly
rendered all the activities enumerated therein legitimate under federal law.
83
In view of that omission and the legislative history of this "anti-injunction"
Act,8 4 the logic of the opinion is questionable. Justice Frankfurter may have
transformed a mere prohibition of equitable remedies into a decriminalization
and a bar to actions for damages.8 5
Nonetheless, Hutcheson remains the starting point for any discussion of
labor's antitrust exemption.8 6 Unions appeared to gain a well-nigh absolute
immunity8 7 from the Court's holding.
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor
groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 are not to be distinguished by any judgment
regarding . .'. the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of
which the particular union activities are the means.8 8
The self-interest requirement has been easy to satisfy. 89 The second proviso
concerning combinations with "non-labor groups" has proven to be far more
troublesome. In the early case of Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW,90 a
powerful union, through the legitimate economic pressure of strikes and
boycotts, had imposed collective bargaining agreements upon balkanized
employers within its jurisdiction, New York City. Both building contractors
and manufacturers of electrical equipment agreed to confine their purchases
and sales to firms which operated under a Local 3 closed shop. The union,
clearly in pursuit of its own best interests, utilized its legal weapons to prevent
non-union operations within the city. "The result was higher wages and
Congressman Celler remarked: "All we do by passage of this bill is to follow the English practice
and relegate the disputants to the criminal side of the law and to actions for damages." Id. at
5490.
83. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), with id. § 104.
84. H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932). In an influential book, which aided in
the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the proposed exemption was described as "cir-
cumscribed: it is not immunity from legal as distinguished from equitable remedies,-hitherto
unlawful conduct remains unlawful . . . ." F. Frankfurter & N. Greene, The Labor Injunction
215 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Frankfurter & Greene]. Obviously, Justice Frankfurter, who
wrote the Hutcheson opinion eleven years later, did not find Professor Frankfurter's viewpoint
very convincing.
85. 312 U.S. at 245 (Roberts, J., dissenting); Siegel, supra note 36, at 442-43.
86. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1975); Bodlne
Produce, Inc. v. UFW, 494 F.2d 541, 554 (9th Cir. 1974).
87. "In short, union activity in pursuit of economic self-interest is exempt from the antitrust
laws." Winter, supra note 25, at 44.
88. 312 U.S. at 232 (footnote omitted).
89. Anything that will improve wages, working conditions, job security or organizational
strength is in a union's self-interest. E.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797,
809 (1945) (product market monopoly would be in union's self-interest and lawful so long as there
were no combination with a business group); Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 824-25 (1945)
(personal antagonism against a particular employer enough to satisfy the self-interest require-
ment).
90. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
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shorter hours for Local 3's members, greater profits for the manufacturers and
contractors, exclusion for outsiders and monopolistic prices for the public." 91
The district court avoided the labor exemption problem by finding that the
case did not arise from a labor dispute.9 2 This was rejected by the Supreme
Court because the union's actions had always been motivated by a desire for
better wages and working conditions. 93 Although the out-of-town manufac-
turers who brought the suit apparently did not consider the employers
significant enough to name as defendants, 94 the Court found a "business
monopoly" in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act which could
not be redeemed by union participation. 95 Justice Black explained that the
"holding means that the same labor union activities may or may not be in
violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether the union acts alone
or in combination with business groups." 9 6 In itself the product market
monopoly was permissible; only the way in which it was achieved was
unlawful. 97
The point at which Local 3 had ceased to act alone was not identified. 98
The Court stated that the collective bargaining agreements which created the
monopoly were presumably legal. They were, however, "but one element in a
far larger program." 99 The "larger program" was the enforcement of the
collective bargaining agreements. It is submitted that there could be no
effective agreements and, ultimately, no union, unless such a "combination"
had been created. If the Court's decision were to be taken literally it would
conflict with section 6 of the Clayton Act10 0 which shielded both the "exis-
tence and operation" of labor unions from the antitrust laws.
An alternative to the Court's explanation of the case is that the product
market monopoly which the union sought and achieved through economic
pressure and collective bargaining was not a goal unions could legitimately
attain. 10 1 Yet, the broad language of Hutcheson, quoted above,'10 2 had
purportedly taken the judiciary out of the labor policy arena. Confronted with
an outrageous situation, the Court was willing to use any means still available
91. Winter, supra note 25, at 45.
92. 51 F. Supp. 36, 37-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
93. 325 U.S. at 807 n.12.
94. Winter, supra note 25, at 49 & n.175.
95. 325 U.S. at 811.
96. Id. at 810.
97. Id. at 809.
98. See St. Antoine, Secondary Boycott: From Antitrust to Labor Relations, 40 Antitrust L.J.
242, 255-56 (1971).
99. 325 U.S. at 809.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970); see text accompanying note 66 supra.
101. The Court appeared to be on the verge of admitting this when it dismissed section 6 of
the Clayton Act because" 'the purpose of mutual help' can hardly be thought to cover activities
for the purpose of 'employer-help' in controlling markets and prices." 325 U.S. at 808. But then it
immediately withdrew from the discussion of union purposes to rely on the "business combina-
tion." Id. at 809.
102. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
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to remedy it and chose the combination proviso. The Court had reluctantly
resumed making labor policy decisions, albeit far narrower in scope than in
earlier cases.103 Nevertheless, it had limited the use of "hot cargo" clauses
fourteeen years before Congress outlawed them in the Landrum-Griffin
Act.' ° 4 Despite protestations that, so long as it acted unilaterally, the union
remained free to do whatever it wished with its legitimate economic weapons,
labor's exemption had been fundamentally restricted.10 5
If there were any doubts, UMW v. Pennington1° 6 expressly stated that a
collective bargaining agreement could constitute a forbidden combination
with business which would deprive a union of its antitrust exemption.10 7
Moreover, the recent decision in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local
100108 indicated that the Clayton/Norris-LaGuardia statutory exemption does
not shield a collective bargaining agreement. 10 9 In Pennington, the Court held
that a wage agreement between a union and a multiemployer group could
expose both parties to treble damage liability for eliminating competition from
marginal producers. 10 The union had allegedly promised to demand the same
wages from smaller, less mechanized mines, although such employers would
be unable to pay and still survive. As in Allen Bradley, the union could
theoretically implement the same scheme if it did so unilaterally. I" However,
a jury may find an illegal combination with business in the ambiguous
conduct of the parties, supplemented by "additional direct or indirect evi-
dence of the conspiracy." ' 12 This threat of antitrust liability encourages
strikes, or at least bellicose rhetoric, in order to prevent any inference of
collusion. ' 13
103. See notes 25-33 supra and accompanying text.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). Under a "hot cargo" clause, an
employer agrees not to handle products which were manufactured or shipped under non-union
conditions. As the term might indicate, it was coined in the trucking industry.
105. Winter, supra note 25, at 55.
106. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
107. "This is not to say that an agreement resulting from union-employer negotiations is
automatically exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny .... [T]here are limits to what a union or an
employer may offer or extract in the name of wages, and because they must bargain does not
mean that the agreement reached may disregard other laws." Id. at 664-65.
108. 421 U.S. 616 (1975), noted in 44 Fordham L. Rev. 191 (1975).
109. The Norris-LaGuardia and Clayton Acts "do not exempt concerted action or agreements
between unions and nonlabor parties." 421 U.S. at 622.
110. 381 U.S. at 665-66. Continuing the tradition of &onfusion in this area of the law, Justice
White stated that, even absent predatory intent, the agreement in question would still contravene
antitrust policy because it would limit the freedom of action of an economic unit, the union. Id. at
668. It has been suggested that the Court's theory runs counter to the law of contracts since every
agreement involves a limitation to some extent upon the freedom of action of the parties.
Handler, Labor and Antitrust: A Bit of History, 40 Antitrust L.J. 233, 240 (1971),
111. 381 U.S. at 665 & n.2; see text accompanying notes 98-105 supra.
112. 381 U.S. at 665 n.2. See also id. at 673 (Douglas, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 720-21 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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Indeed, it appears that the Duplex" 4 and Coronado"15 cases have been
resurrected under a new rubric. The only difference is that employers must
now be joined with the union as defendants. It will be recalled that in Duplex,
for example, the employers indicated that they would withdraw from their
collective bargaining agreements unless the Duplex Company was forced to
pay similar wages and benefits. Such statements by employers, followed by
union action against a competitor like Duplex, could constitute the indirect
evidence of a conspiracy which would justify antitrust liability under Pen-
nington. The significance of this should not .be underestimated. Especially
where a union has not yet organized the employees of all the competitors in a
particular product market,1 6 one of the primary topics in negotiations will be
the probable effect of an agreement on the employer's competitive position . 117
The survival of both sides could hinge on the union's ability to subject other
employers to comparable labor costs. 1 8 It is totally unrealistic to expect the
bargaining parties to ignore these considerations and it is likely that, before a
settlement is reached, there will be a tacit understanding on the union's
intentions in regard to competitors.
A. A Derivative Exemption
A collective bargaining agreement may nevertheless enjoy a limited
nonstatutory exemption if it is determined that, under the federal labor and
antitrust laws, the competing national policies favoring collective bargaining
and commercial competition can best be accommodated by granting such an
exemption. 119 The leading case is Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea
Co.,1 20 where an agreement between several local unions and an employers'
association included a restriction on marketing hours which deprived large
self-service markets of their competitive advantage in longer, more convenient
shopping periods. 12 1 Emphasizing that the union had not conspired with the
small shopowners to impose the restraint for the latters' benefit, 122 three
Justices agreed that in this instance the product market restriction was "so
intimately related" to the conditions of employment that it "[fell] within the
protection of the national labor policy and [was] therefore exempt from the
Sherman Act."'123 The opinion set its own guidelines, citing the "relative
114. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); see holes 70-76 supra and
accompanying text.
115. Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259
U.S. 344 (1922); see notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text.
116. In the rubber industry negotiations this spring, for example, employers will be demand-
ing lower wages in non-tire plants because of the competition they face in that area from "scores
of nonunionized companies." Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1976, at 4, col. 4.
117. 381 U.S. at 714 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
118. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
119. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).
120. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
121. Id. at 682.
122. Id. at 688.
123. Id. at 689-90.
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impact on the product market and the interests of union members" as the
"crucial determinant. '124 Three other Justices dissented, arguing that the
collective bargaining agreement was itself an antitrust violation which could
not be distinguished from Allen Bradley.125 Finally, the remainder of the
Court threw the balance in favor of exemption, 126 but based its opinion on an
automatic immunity for bona fide agreements concerning mandatory subjects
of collective bargaining, 127 a theory which has never been accepted by a
majority of the Court and which directly conflicts with the prevailing view
that such agreements may be exempted only after labor and antitrust policies
have been accommodated.
1 28
The single majority opinion in Connell, using language reminiscent of Apex,
defined this nonstatutory exemption as a "tolerance for the lessening of
business competition based on differences in wages and working condi-
tions.' 1 29 On the other hand, the Pennington case, which involved an alleged
conspiracy to remove "differences in wages," was cited with apparent ap-
proval. 130 Furthermore, the Court warned that substantial restraints which
do not "follow naturally" from the elimination of labor market competition
will be subject to the antitrust laws and their severe remedies. 1 3 1
The precise boundaries of the nonstatutory exemption remain undefined,132
in part because balancing tests are inherently unpredictable. Indeed, this
nonstatutory exemption differs little, except in terminology, from a full scale
scrutiny under the rule of reason.133 Also, Connell involved secondary union
action against a company which the union had no interest in organizing. 134 In
a case where a collective bargaining relationship could exist, even the Connell
Court might find a broader immunity.135 Whatever exemption is allowed for
collective bargaining agreements is, of course, equally applicable to both the
labor and business organizations that are parties to them. 136 Employers, such
as the retailers' association in Jewel Tea, will or will not be exposed to
124. Id. at 690 n.5.
125. Id. at 735-37 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 697, 710 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
127. These include "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
128. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975); UMW v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662 (1965); Allen Bradley v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945).
129. 421 U.S. at 622.
130. Id.; see notes 106-18 supra and accompanying text.
131. 421 U.S. at 625.
132. Bodine Produce, Inc. v. UFW, 494 F.2d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 1974).
133. Handler, Labor and Antitrust: A Bit of History, 40 Antitrust L.J. 233, 239-40 (1971).
134. The union, which represented employees of subcontractors, picketed general contractors
and gained an agreement that they would subcontract work to be done at the construction site
only to unionized subcontractors. 421 U.S. at 618-19.
135. Id. at 625-26.
136. Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 729-30 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462, 498-500 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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antitrust suits based on such agreements, depending entirely upon whether
the unions with which they bargain are held exempt.
B. A Countervailing Exemption
Unlike joint activity between labor and management such as a collective
bargaining agreement, lockouts and mutual aid are strictly employer actions.
They are, nevertheless, essentially elements of labor-management relations
which may warrant a nonstatutory exemption similar to that granted to
certain collective bargaining agreements.1 37 Just as there is a tolerance for
commercial restraints which naturally flow from the elimination of labor
market competition,1 38 so also should there be indulgence for limitations upon
commercial competition arising from labor disputes.' 39 The national labor
laws represent a policy of encouraging private settlement of union-employer
disagreements, as well as a policy of encouraging collective bargaining, and
both policies presume the freedom of the parties to resort to self-help to the
limits of their resources once impasse has been reached.' 4 0
The case law on the subject is limited because unions have enjoyed an
automatic exemption for any kind of unilateral activity since the passage of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act14 1 in 1932, and the national labor law did not
begin to develop generally until the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935. 42 In
the few antitrust actions brought against employers for their unilateral
activities, decisions have usually rested on grounds such as the inapplicability
of the antitrust laws to the labor market 143 and a possible statutory exemption
for employers. 144 Still, the courts have been impressed with the eminent good
sense of utilizing the labor laws rather than the antitrust laws when dealing
with activities which are an integral part of labor-management relations. t4S
The concept has not been expressly stated but awkwardness can be sensed as
the court, like a surgeon operating with a mechanic's tool kit, applies the
137. See notes 119-36 supra and accompanying text.
138. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 625 (1975).
139. An employers' combination to defend against strikes is "so vitally an element in a clash
between labor and management that it could only be dealt with on that basis, i.e., the controls
imposed by our labor law statutes on the balances or imbalances of power allowable in a
collective bargaining confrontation." Christensen, The Abuse of Power in Labor-Management
Relations, 40 Antitrust L.J. 259, 264 (1971).
140. See notes 202-03 infra and accompanying text.
141. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); see notes
77-88 supra and accompanying text.
142. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-70 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
143. Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366, 372-73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830
(1963); see notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
144. Clune v. Publishers' Ass'n, 214 F. Supp. 520, 528-29 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mer., 314 F.2d
343 (2d Cir. 1963); see notes 153-92 infra and accompanying text.
145. Christensen, The Abuse of Power in Labor-Management Relations, 40 Antitrust L.J.
259, 264 (1971); St. Antoine, Secondary Boycott: From Antitrust to Labor Relations, id. at 242,
257; Winter, supra note 25, at 66.
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sweeping prohibitions of the Sherman Act to the delicate balance of organized
labor and capital.
An illustrative case is Clune v. Publishers' Association, 146 where a craft
union whipsawed several newspapers.147 Pursuant to an agreement, the
non-struck papers locked out members of the striking union and laid off the
rest of their employees. Members of a non-striking union claimed this
concerted action was in violation of the Sherman Act.148 Intuitively rejecting
the application of the antitrust laws to a labor dispute, the court suggested
that there was no commercial restraint. 149 Then, .quite accurately, it described
the employers' actions as basically an "attempt to maintain a bargaining
position with the union . . . to counter a 'whipsaw' strike."' 50 Although it
placed a heavy burden on the public by terminating all newspaper service, the
lockout could be justified because it was in furtherance of this legitimate labor
market purpose.
The primary advantage of such a nonstatutory approach is flexibility. It
permits the public interest to be considered as well as the interests of the
parties. On the other hand, this very flexibility requires judges to make broad
policy decisions, based largely upon their own attitudes and prejudices, 15'
concerning labor-management relations. Moreover, the mere possibility of
antitrust liability may preclude any effective coordinated action by employers.
In those industries where a large union faces a group of small businesses the
imbalance in bargaining power 52 might be immutable without a more
reliable antitrust exemption.
C. A Statutory Exemption
Federal courts, both before and after passage of the Clayton Act, tended to
support the position of employers in industrial disputes. 1 3 They granted
injunctions to enforce or to prohibit interference with "yellow dog" con-
tracts,'5 4 which one would have thought beyond the protection of equity.15 5
146. 214 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 314 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1963) (per curlam).
147. The International Typographical Union struck four of the nine members of the associa-
tion. Id. at 522.
148. Id. at 522-24.
149. Id. at 525; see Christensen, The Abuse of Power in Labor-Management Relations, 40
Antitrust L.J. 259, 264 (1971).
150. 214 F. Supp. at 524.
151. See note 29 supra.
152. See generally F. Peterson, American Labor Unions-What They Are and How They
Work 127-39 (2d rev. ed. 1963).
153. See Frankfurter & Greene, supra note 84, at 32-35, 96-105.
154. See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 261 (1917). Senator
Norris described the yellow dog contract in the Norris-LaGuardia Act debates: "It requires the
employee, as a condition of obtaining employment, to agree that he will not join a union ...;
that he recognizes the right of the employer to discharge him without notice; that he will not quit
his employment without giving sufficient notice to his employer to enable him to hire some one to
take his place. The employee ... agrees in advance to accept such conditions of labor, hours of
labor, and so forth, as may from time to time be decided upon by the employer." 75 Cong. Rec.
4504 (1932).
155. Although theoretically the worker was free to refuse to sign the contract, the practical
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They also enjoined alleged violations of the Sherman Act, issuing decrees at
once broad in scope and detailed in-provisions. In Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co.,' 5 6 the union was enjoined from "interfering in any manner with
• . .the complainant's .. .business."' 5 7 In other cases, the courts imposed
patently unconstitutional "restraints against speech,-'abusive language', 'an-
noying language', 'indecent language', 'bad language', 'opprobrious epi-
thets',-and against specific words such as 'scab', 'traitor', 'unfair'."158 The
results were broken strikes' 5 9 or, where there was sufficient worker solidarity,
defiance followed by violence. 160 Employers as a class had not only economic
but also legal superiority.16 ' Certainly they were not in need of legislative
relief.
This economic and judicial history was the impetus for enactment of the
labor sections of the Clayton Act and later for the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
162
The descriptions of judicial absurdities and industrial imbalance in the
legislative history of the statutes has led some to believe that any exemption
the Acts created was for the benefit of labor organizations alone. 163 It is
asserted that, except for the few instances when the two statutes specifically
mention employers, business groups can use labor's antitrust shield only
derivatively as a defense to suits based upon joint union-employer activity
such as collective bargaining agreements.
It is submitted, however, that section 20 of the Clayton Act, as supple-
mented by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, exempts lockouts and employers'
mutual aid or strike insurance plans from the antitrust laws. The rather
ambiguous legislative history of the statutes'" indicates an assumption of
consequence of such a refusal would be to go without means of support, since in many industries
every employer required the signing of such a contract as a condition of employment. It may also
have been contrary to public policy because it prevented workers from having any say in setting
the terms or conditions of their employment. 75 Cong. Rec. 4504 (1932) (Senator Norris); see
Frankfurter & Greene, supra note 84, at 212.
156. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
157. Id. at 421 n.1.
158. Frankfurter & Greene, supra note 84, at 98 (footnotes omitted); see id. at 253-74 (texts of
various injunctions).
159. E.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 245 (1917); see Frankfurter
& Greene, supra note 84, at 277-78.
160. Frankfurter & Greene, supra note 84, at 275-76.
161. Of course, at least in theory, employers were subject to the same legal attacks as the
unions. E.g., Industrial Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 77 (1925) (Coronado standard
applied to employers' group but no finding of intent to restrain product market); Cornellier v.
Haverhill Shoe Mfrs.' Ass'n, 221 Mass. 554, 560, 109 N.E. 643, 645 (1915) (blacklisting held
unlawful conspiracy).
162. See Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 700-13 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., concurring).
163. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 310 F.2d 513, 516-18 (7th
Cir. 1962); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 884-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Strike Insurance
Note, supra note 56, at 138; cf. Allen Bradley v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 803 (1945);
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462,
496-500 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 605-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
164. It has been suggested that finding legislative intent, particularly in the congressional
history of the Clayton Act, may well be a fiction. Frankfurter & Greene, supra note 84, at 144-45.
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equality in application, perhaps based on a fear that the Court would
otherwise find the section in violation of the equal protection clause. 165
Whatever the reason, the House Judiciary Committee Report on the Clayton
Act describes the specific conduct listed in section 20 as "within the right of
parties involved on one side or the other of a trades dispute. '166 The Senate
Judiciary Committee Report on the Norris-LaGuardia Act declares:
Moreover, it will be observed that this section [6], as do most all of the other
prohibitive sections of the bill, applies both to organizations of labor and organizations
of capital. The same rule throughout the bill wherever it is applicable, applies both to
employers and employees, and also to organizations of employers and employees. ' 67
The early case law and commentary on the Clayton Act tended to support
applicability to both unions and management. In Duplex, 168 the first Supreme
Court case interpreting the Act, 169 the Court divided on the issue of whether
the exemption extended to persons involved in secondary disputes, but again
equal application appears to have been assumed. The majority felt that
Congress had confined the section to "parties standing in proximate relation to
a controversy."' 7 0 Justice Brandeis' dissent, which has "carried the day in the
courts of history,"1' 71 stated that the statute created a "right of industrial
combatants to push their struggle to the limits . . . of self-interest. M72 The Act
was described as removing " 'all restrictions which now prevent the freedom
of action of both parties to industrial disputes ... thus legalizing the strike,
the lockout, the boycott, the blacklist, the bringing in of strikebreakers, and
peaceful picketingz' ,,173 Indeed, it was frightening to one early commentator
who argued that "[t]o allow labor disputes to settle themselves by protracted
struggles of might smacks of the primitive administration of justice by
self-help.1"174
The Clayton Act, and later the Norris-LaGuardia Act, demanded the
withdrawal of the judiciary from industrial wars and left both parties free to
engage in a limited number of specified activities without fear of incurring
legal liability and without interference from equity.'17  A reading of the
statutes also tends to support this conclusion, although it must be noted that
the Clayton Act in particular is laden with ambiguities.
The second paragraph of section 20176 prohibits injunctions against "any
165. See id. at 139 n.16.
166. H.R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1914).
167. S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1932).
168. 254 U.S. 443 (1921); see notes 70-76 supra and accompanying text.
169. The Clayton Act had been discussed in Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 471
(1917), but the Court held that it had been passed too late to be applicable in that case. See
Frankfurter & Greene, supra note 84, at 145, 166.
170. 254 U.S. at 470-71.
171. Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 703 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
172. 254 U.S. at 488 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 486-87 n.2, quoting Report of the Commission on Industrial Relations 136 (191S).
174. 30 Harv. L. Rev. 632, 637 (1917).
175. Cox, The Role of Law in Labor Disputes, 39 Cornell L.Q. 592, 595-96 (1934).
176. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
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person or persons," while the immediately preceding paragraph distinguished
between "employers and employees." It would appear that, if the paragraph
and its historic exemption were to be limited to workingmen and their
organizations, even minimally competent draftsmen would have used more
specific language or expressly omitted employers. Moreover, the section
includes a series of disjunctions which could apply to either side of a
controversy:
terminating any relation of employment, or... ceasing to perform any work or labor
... or ... peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain from working, or
... ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute... or... giving to,
or withholding from, any person engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or other
moneys or things of value .... "'
The paragraph concludes by totally exempting all the enumerated conduct
from "any law of the United States." 178
In the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress was far more specific, perhaps
sensing after Duplex, the necessity of being explicit. The purpose clause,
section 2, indicates that the motivation was again the protection of labor:
"Whereas under prevailing economic conditions . . . the individual unor-
ganized worker is commonly helpless . . .it is necessary that he have full
freedom of association ... and that he shall be free from the interference...
of employers of labor .... ,,179 The means to this end was again to be the
removal of judges, biased or otherwise, from industrial struggles.18 0 The
definition of "a person participating or interested in a labor dispute,"'' which
was incorporated into section 20 by the Hutcheson case,' 8 2 includes employers
and associations of employers. The Act deprives the federal courts of jurisdic-
tion to enjoin any such persons "(as these terms are herein defined) from
doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts .... ',1s3 There
follows a list which covers essentially all the conduct specified in section 20.
Impartiality reached an extreme when, in rendering "yellow dog" contracts
unenforceable in federal courts, the Act included agreements which barred
membership in an employers' association. 18 4
Despite the apparently reciprocal nature of the statute, the Seventh Cir-
cuit ruled in Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R.1 85 that Norris-LaGuardia afforded employers no protection against
injunctions and, in dictum, implied that the Clayton exemption was similarly
one-sided.1 86 There is a division of authority on the issue since the Clune 8 7
177. Id.
178. Id.; see text accompanying notes 68-69 supra.
179. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
180. Cox, The Role of Law in Labor Disputes, 39 Cornell L.Q. 592, 595-96 (1954).
181. 29 U.S.C. § 113(b) (1970).
182. 312 U.S. at 234-36.
183. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
184. Id. § 103.
185. 310 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1962).
186. Id. at 516-18.
187. 214 F. Supp. 520, 528 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 314 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1963) (per curiam).
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opinion, which principally relied on section 20 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act
to deny an injunction against a group of employers, was affirmed by the
Second Circuit. It appears that the Clune decision is correct.
In accord with Locomotive Engineers, the recent decision in Robertson v.
NBA' 8 8 emphatically rejected the concept of dual applicability for the
Clayton/Norris-LaGuardia exemption: "A simple and concise answer to de-
fendants' contention is that the exemption extends only to labor or union
activities, and not to the activities of employers. "1 9 The product market
monopoly challenged in the case was a clear Sherman Act violation and the
defendants' conduct could never come within section 20, so the court's
discussion of the exemption issue did not lead to the wrong result. Neverthe-
less, the opinion is noteworthy for its use of a new argument against a
reciprocal exemption. Citing Allen Bradley and the subsequent cases which
have toiled mightily with the problem, the court reasoned that since labor
loses its exemption when it combines with business groups, it would be
strange indeed to find that business groups by themselves could enjoy an
exemption based upon the same statutes. 190 However, the line of "combina-
tion" cases from Allen Bradley to Jewel Tea' 91 is fundamentally inapposite to
any discussion of a statutory exemption which is concerned only with certain
unilateral conduct by alliances on opposing sides of industrial disputes. They
should not be read to deny the protection provided by the Clayton and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts for the activities of employers prior to entering a labor
agreement. Of course, it must be noted that Robertson was written before the
Connell192 decision in which the Supreme Court clearly distinguished between
the statutory and nonstatutory exemptions. The latter deals with collective
bargaining agreements and other concerted action by labor and management,
the former with the weapons of industrial war.
IV. THE LABOR LAWS
The NLRA 93 is a regulatory code, primarily administered by the
NLRB,194 which injects the government into the center of labor-management
relations. 195 The Act protects the right of workers to organize and act
collectively through a union, 196 imposes a duty to bargain in good faith upon
both sides' 97 and grants the Board wide authority to decide whether these
188. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
189. Id. at 884-85.
190. Id. at 885-89.
191. See notes 90-136 supra and accompanying text.
192. 421 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1975).
193. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
194. NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975). The federal courts, nevertheless,
may decide labor law questions that arise as collateral issues in antitrust cases without first
seeking the Board's opinion. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 626
(1975).
195. See Cox, The Role of Law in Labor Disputes, 39 Cornell L.Q. 592, 596 (1954).
196. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
197. Id. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d); Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
1401 (1958).
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rights and duties have been properly observed in a particular case. ' 98 The Act
prohibits certain activities, such as secondary boycotts' 9 9 and blacklists,2 00
and has been interpreted to limit the purposes for which others may be
used.20' Congress, however, has not authorized the NLRB or anyone else to
dictate the terms of a labor agreement.202 It follows that any weapons, not
prohibited by Congress, are generally free from government regulation under
the labor laws when used for economic advantage in a dispute over terms of
employment, because control of these weapons would ultimately determine
the substance of a settlement.2 0 3
Thus, like the single employer, 204 a group of employers, including those
who have locked out union members in response to a whipsaw, need not
remain idle during a strike.20 5 Where practicable, they may hire strikebreak-
ers, at least as temporary replacements, and attempt to continue business.2 0 6
Moreover, in the two suits which have challenged the use of strike insurance
or mutual aid, plaintiffs have failed to establish any violation of national
labor policy. 20 7 Nevertheless, in a particular case such concerted employer
action could conceivably infringe upon employees' rights or violate employers'
duties as established by the labor laws.20 8
A. The Duty to Bargain Within an Appropriate Unit
The Buffalo Linen case2 0 9 determined that employers who have bargained
as a unit may respond to a whipsaw strike with a multiemployer lockout. In
198. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
199. Id. § 158(b)(4).
200. Id. § 158(a)(3).
201. E.g., NLRB v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 F.2d 690, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1965) (lockout
cannot be used to impose multiemployer bargaining without union consent); see notes 209-16 infra
and accompanying text.
202. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485-87 (1960).
203. Id. at 497-98; NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 283 (1965) (multiemployer group may use
strikebreakers as temporary replacements to ensure success of their defensive lockout); American
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965) (offensive or bargaining lockout permissible
since it has not been prohibited by Congress).
204. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938) (hiring strikebreakers not
an unfair labor practice).
205. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
206. Id. at 285.
207. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
972 (1975); Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830
(1963); accord, Six-Carrier Mut. Aid Pact, 29 C.A.B. 168, 170-73 (1959). A complaint against the
mutual aid pact in the rubber industry was dismissed by the Regional Director of the NLRB as
insufficient "to sustain the charge that the rubber companies bargained in bad faith." Hirsch,
supra note 14, at 403.
208. See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965) (dictum); American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965). For earlier discussions of possible labor law violations arising from
the use of mutual aid see Comment, Six Carrier Mutual Aid Pact: A New Concept of
Management Strike Strategy in the Airline Industry, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 205, 209-21 (1960); Strike
Insurance Note, supra note 56, at 138-44.
209. NLRB v. Teamsters Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957); see notes 11-13 supra and
accompanying text
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the absence of an established multiemployer unit, however, the Second
Circuit, in NLRB v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 210 held that the same
tactic was an unfair labor practice. Despite the clear threat to the non-struck
employers, 2 1' the concerted action was viewed as an attempt to impose
multiemployer bargaining without union consent in violation of the NLRA. 2 12
Distinguishing the defensive lockout in Buffalo Linen, the court described the
employers' action as "an offensive weapon which would unfairly advantage
the employers in their demands for a multi-employer unit. '2 13 The reasoning,
or at least the language, of the A & P opinion is questionable in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 2 14 which
upheld the use of such an "offensive" lockout by a single employer "solely as a
means to bring economic pressure to bear in support of the employer's
bargaining position . . .,"215 once negotiations had reached an impasse.
However, the holding in A & P is still valid. Employers may not use their
otherwise legitimate weapons for prohibited purposes2 16 such as the unilateral
imposition of a new bargaining structure.
Strike insurance could be used in an attempt to create multiemployer
bargaining. 21 7 Certainly it may pressure a union into a change of tactics.
Recently, the United Rubber Workers (URW), attributing the ineffectiveness
of its 1973 whipsaw to an employers' mutual aid pact, began considering a
market-wide strike rather than its traditional selective tactics. 218 However, a
loss of tactical power does not, in itself, force a union to bargain with
employers as a group. 2 19 Some additional evidence is needed to show an
illegal intent on the part of the employers. 220 For example, if it were proven
210. 340 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965).
211. See notes 3-10 supra and accompanying text.
212. 340 F.2d at 692-93; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a, b) (1970).
213. 340 F.2d at 693.
214. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
215. Id. at 308; see note 232 infra.
216. "It is important to note that there is here no allegation that the employer used the
lockout in the service of designs inimical to the process of collective bargaining." 380 U.S. at 308;
cf. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453, 456 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 972 (1975); NLRB v. Bagel Bakers Council, 434 F.2d 884, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971).
217. Six-Carrier Mut. Aid Pact, 29 C.A.B. 168, 181-83 (1959) (Minetti, Member, dissenting);
Strike Insurance Note, supra note 56, at 141-44.
218. Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1976, at 4, col. 4. However, the employers' ability to stockpile In
this manufacturing industry may have been more crucial than the mutual idd pact. In 1967, the
companies had sufficient materials on hand to satisfy demand for several weeks during a strike.
Hirsch, supra note 14, at 403.
219. One author predicted that the airlines' mutual aid pact would force the unions Into
multiemployer bargaining, but now nearly twenty years later they are still bargaining on a single
carrier basis. Kahn, Mutual Strike Aid in the Airlines, 11 Lab. L.J. 595, 604 (1960). However, at
its own request, the International Association of Machinists bargained with a multiemployer
group during 1965. Hirsch, supra note 14, at 405.
220. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 283 (1965); American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380
U.S. 300, 308-09, 313 (1965); see Strike Insurance Note, supra note 56, at 142.
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that the plan permitted contributors to control the terms upon which the
struck employer could settle, then it would appear that the union was being
required to bargain on a multiemployer basis without its consent.2 71
Both of the agreements which have been examined in litigation involved
employers who bargained separately, but neither was found to impose mul-
tiemployer bargaining. 222 The airlines' mutual aid pact provides financial
assistance to the struck employer "without regard to the popularity of its
bargaining posture among the other parties. ' 223 In like manner, the railroad
strike policy specifically stated that the insured was free to settle at any
time. 224 The probative value of these self-proclamations of innocence 22S may
be slight, but plaintiffs have been unable to overcome them. Most other
mutual aid pacts are shrouded in secrecy-indeed, in some industries there is
only speculation that they exist22 6 -so whether they restrain the freedom of
the struck employer to bargain in his individual interest is unknown. It
appears, however, that the evidence problem may be insurmountable, espe-
cially since the employers are free to exchange information on labor costs and
frequently indicate to one another the range within which they intend to
settle.227
B. The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith
In analyzing the impact of strike insurance upon collective bargaining, a
wide range of factors can be considered including the circumstances in which
an employer would be entitled to aid, "any history of employer animus toward
the union, the extent of insurance coverage (for example, whether there is
reimbursement of only fixed costs . . . or of lost profits as well) . . . and [the]
extent of economic pressures exerted by the union .... ',22 To determine
whether an employer has bargained in good faith, however, primary attention
must be given to his behavior at the bargaining table. 229 Although at one time
221. Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 211 F. Supp. 478, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d
366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963); Six-Carrier MuL Aid Pact, 29 C.A.B. 168, 172
(1959).
222. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Intl v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453, 456 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975); Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 211 F. Supp. 478, 488 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963). Labor relations in both the
airline and railroad industries are regulated by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88
(1970), rather than the NLRA. However, an appropriate bargaining unit requirement has been
found in 45 U.S.C. § 152, which states that bargaining is to be between "parties to the dispute."
Kennedy v. Long Island R1R, supra at 488.
223. Six-Carrier Mut. Aid Pact, 29 C.A.B. 168, 172 (1959).
224. Kennedy v. Long Island 1R., 211 F. Supp. 478, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d
366 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963).
225. Strike Insurance Note, supra note 56, at 143.
226. Hirsch, supra note 14, at 400; Strike Insurance Note, supra note 56, at 127 n.4.
227. McPherson, Cooperation Among Auto Managements in Collective Bargaining, 11 Lab.
L.J. 607 (1960); Stieber, Company Cooperation in Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel
Industry, 11 Lab. L.J. 614 (1960).
228. Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366, 371 & n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
830 (1963).
229. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960).
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the good faith requirement had expanded to control the use of certain
weapons, 230 it is now settled that bad faith may not be inferred from the mere
exertion of economic pressure absent evidence of insincerity or hostility in
bargaining. 231 If the procedures established by the labor laws are satisfied,
use of financial aid to enhance an employer's bargaining power will not render
his behavior objectionable. 232
C. The Right to Strike
Unlike the Railway Labor Act (RLA)23 3 which regulates labor relations in
both the railroad and airline industries, the NLRA expressly protects the right
to strike. 234 Any attempt by employers to limit this right is an unfair labor
practice. 235 On the other hand, "an employer may legitimately blunt the
effectiveness of an anticipated strike . . . even if he thereby makes himself
'virtually strikeproof.' "236 Moreover, strike insurance, unlike a bargaining
lockout, operates only after employees have exercised their right to strike. 23 7
The economic pressure it brings to bear upon a union will be held lawful
unless its purpose is to punish employees for using their protected weapon.238
As with the appropriate bargaining unit requirement, 239 independent evi-
dence is needed to show this hostile intent.240
However, even absent illegal intent, there are some broad limits on
employers' weapons. If strike insurance proved to be "demonstrably so
destructive of employee rights and so devoid of significant service to any
legitimate business end"' 241 it could then be in violation of the Act. Obviously,
it would be difficult to meet this standard. In both the airline and railroad
230. Cox, The Duty To Bargain In Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401, 1428-42 (1958).
231. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960); Cox, The Duty To
Bargain In Good Faith, 71 Harv. L.Rev. 1401, 1418-28 (1958) (examples of bad faith bargaining).
232. "[Oince these [collective bargaining] procedures are exhausted without a settlement,
either side is free to resort to economic self-help in an attempt to force a settlement most favorable
to it." Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 972 (1975); accord, Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366, 371 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 380 (1963).
233. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970).
234. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163 (1970), with 45 U.S.C. § 152 Fourth (1970).
235. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
236. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 283 (1965).
237. "It cannot reasonably be claimed that [a multiemployer defensive] lockout has deprived
the employees of their right to strike, as they did strike, and the scope or scale of the strike was a
strategic or tactical decision and not one that should alter substantive rights . . . . [Tihe
overriding public policy at this point would seem to favor the rapid conclusion of the labor battle
by submerging the disputed matters in a collective bargaining agreement, and any limitation of
otherwise legitimate economic weapons and counter-weapons constitutes a barrier to this objec-
tive." Duvin, The Bargaining Lockout: An Impatient Warrior, 40 Notre Dame Law. 137, 155-56
(1965) (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
238. See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 282 (1965).
239. See notes 209-27 supra and accompanying text.
240. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308-09 (1965).
241. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 286 (1965).
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industries, unions have remained strong despite strike insurance. Indeed, they
have achieved such substantial victories that the effectiveness of strike
insurance in these industries is clearly limited. 242 In the rubber industry,
however, workers feel they were defeated in their last strike by an employers'
mutual aid pact.243 The URW is in such a weak position that skilled
craftsmen are attempting separate unionization. Most importantly, in this
manufacturing industry there is much less need for strike insurance since the
more effective weapon of stockpiling is available. 2 " In an apparent attempt
to regain the confidence of both skilled and production workers, the URW
intends to demand a fifty percent increase in compensation in its contract
negotiations this spring.2 45 The companies are unlikely to come anywhere
near this level in their proposals and, with a full array of weapons, they are in
a position to prevail. If the union fails to obtain even reasonable gains, a
further weakening in its organization will result and, at that point, there
might be enough to challenge successfully the mutual aid pact and have it
eliminated from management's arsenal.
V. CONCLUSION
Labor disputes engender hostile public opinion because they impose incon-
venience and occasionally hardship upon consumers. If, as expected, there is
an increase in the number and duration of such controversies during this
period of recession, the resulting public opposition could bring greater gov-
ernmental regulation of the economic pressures exerted by labor and man-
agement. Employers' mutual aid could become a scapegoat since, at least
overtly, it is a relative newcomer to labor disputes and might be identified as
the cause of their prolongation. Certainly, mutual aid enables a marginal
employer or a whipsaw target to hold out for more favorable terms and, in
contrast to a union strike benefit fund, it lacks the human justification of the
need to sustain a striker and his family. On the other hand, where a union is
aware of an employers' support plan, the chances of settlement without
interruption of business may be enhanced because the decision to strike must
be made with knowledge that the struggle could be longer and victory less
likely. In addition, by their reflection in more stable prices, lower increases in
labor costs would probably benefit consumers. 246
242. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 972 (1975); Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366, 370 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 830 (1963).
243. Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1976, at 4, col. 4.
244. Hirsch, supra note 14, at 403.
245. Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1976, at 4, col. 4.
246. Ordinarily, this might be an overly sanguine expectation since cost savings can increase
profits as well as stabilize prices. However, employer resistance to union demands, particularly
organized multiemployer resistance, tends to increase as the ability to pass such costs along to the
consumer decreases. Thus, the strike insurance and mutual aid agreement in the railroad and
airline industries are probably related to the comparatively easy substitution of other transport
services and the inability of employers to raise prices without the approval of regulatory agencies.
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If Congress were nevertheless to decide that the public burdens of labor
disputes had grown to intolerable proportions, it should realize that control of
economic weapons is tantamount to government determination of employees'
compensation. With such awareness, it is unlikely that regulation would be
politically acceptable. Even assuming that legislation could be enacted, the
issue would be handled more rationally by comprehensive planning, consider-
ing such factors as productivity, inflation and labor supply, rather than by
indirect tinkering through regulation of the activities of the opposing parties.
Unless and until Congress moves toward a more controlled economy, the
ability of each side to exert pressure against the other will be an essential part
of any non-governmental settlement of labor disputes. As under present
federal law, once the procedural requirements of collective bargaining have
been satisfied, employers as well as unions will remain free "to push their
struggle to the limits of the justification of self-interest. '247
Eugene Cronin
The major manufacturing oligopolies may also be stiffening their bargaining position in response
to the impressive market shares gained by imports and the traditional increase in the price
elasticity of consumer demand during a recession. In a stronger economy, automobile purchasers,
for example, would be willing to pay more for a new car, while now a significant number would
keep their old model or consider purchasing a foreign car, often smaller in price as well as size.
247. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
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